Anti-Rape Law of 1997

taken from http://jlp-law.com/blog/anti-rape-law-1997-republic-act-8353

this is only a part and is incomplete. brought up in relation to a debate on non-female rape cases and the subic rape case.

3. Fourth mode of committing rape. - Prior to 1997, rape is considered committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The new law added a fourth mode of committing rape on a woman – by fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.

4. Rape may now be committed against men, not only against women. Rape is committed by “any person who xxx shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.”

5. Rape now includes acts other than penile penetration of the vaginal orifice. The provision quoted above means that, among other things, a woman may now be charged of raping another woman.

6. On statutory rape. - The new law provides that statutory rape may be committed even though none of the three other modes are present. RA 8353 provides that rape is committed by “a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.”

7. Kind of resistance and proof. Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the rape in any degree from the victim is admissible as evidence of lack of consent. Tenacious resistance, however, is not required. Neither is a determined and persistent physical struggle on the part of the victim necessary. In drafting the new law, the legislators agreed that Article 266-D is intended to “soften the jurisprudence of the 1970’s” when resistance to rape was required to be tenacious. The lawmakers took note of the fact that rape victims cannot mount a physical struggle in cases where they were gripped by overpowering fear or subjugated by moral authority. Article 266-D tempered the case law requirement of physical struggle by the victim with the victim’s fear of the rapist or incapacity to give valid consent. Thus, the law now provides that resistance may be proved by any physical overt act in any degree from the offended party (People vs. Dulay).